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ABSTRACT

REDUCING DEFAULTS IN MICROFINANCE:
A CASE STUDY OF FUNDACIÓN INTEGRAL CAMPESINO
(FINCA) COSTA RICA

By
Katherine Stackel
May 2010

Thesis supervised by Dr. Clifford Bob and Dr. Daniel Lieberfeld
This study seeks to determine why some microfinance institutions have
high default rates, while others have low ones. Three literature-based hypotheses
regarding default reduction were tested on communal credit enterprises (CCEs) of a
poverty-focused microfinance program called FINCA Costa Rica. Specifically, five
CCEs in the Osa region, and one CCE (not within the Osa) created by FINCA CR. Four
financially healthy CCEs that have low default rates were compared with the one that is
at a high-risk for failure, to determine what exactly caused this to happen when so many
variables were controlled. It is hypothesized that more group unity, better training
programs, and more discipline will reduce defaults within microfinance institutions.
Results show that group unity was not associated with low default rates, while better
training programs and discipline were. The results also show that because of important
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limitations in this study, additional research is needed in order to provide more reliable
results.
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Chapter 1- Introduction

Introduction
In the 1970s, microfinance came into the spotlight as one of the most innovative
ideas for alleviating poverty within the development sphere. The trend quickly grew.
Microfinance programs work by offering credit to collateral-less borrowers, the poorest
population that is generally not given access to these opportunities. This credit could be
used for entrepreneurial activities or other activities which may reduce poverty.
Benefits of Microfinance
Generally microfinance has been hailed within the development community
because it is unlike foreign aid and does not rely on the state for its existence. Some
purported benefits arise by creating access to credit for the poor. The idea is that once the
poor are able to access credit, they will engage and invest in entrepreneurial activities.
With this line of credit, through taking advantage of market access, they are able to
generate profit that will benefit them on their own, without depending on state resources.
Franklin Simtowe, an African Agricultural Economist and researcher, said that there is
now “enormous evidence” that market access has enabled the poor to participate as
“viable actors in the economy.”1 Until microfinance came into play, foreign aid was one
of the main methods of getting ahead.
Another method of getting ahead, closer in similarity to microfinance, still exists
today. This method is borrowing money from moneylenders, or loan sharks.

1

Taken from: Simtowe, Franklin. 2006. “Determinants of Intra-group Insurance in Microfinance: Empirical Evidence
from Joint Liability Lending Schemes in Malawi.” Microfinance Gateway. Germany: University of Bonn. Retrieved
December 2008 (http://www.microfinancegateway.org/p/site/m//template.rc/1.9.27282). Page 1.
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Moneylenders loan money to individuals with high interest rates, which sometimes
comes with added stipulations. For example, they will loan money to an entrepreneur and
require that person to sell their goods back to them at a very cheap price. An article in the
Wall Street Journal describes this as a problem for poor people, not only because
moneylenders charge interest rates that are so high they could almost never be paid back,
but also because the borrowers are obligated to sell their goods for lower than what may
be the market price in some cases.2 In some cases moneylenders might be the only ones
providing financial access for poor borrowers. Indeed, Yunus also mentions this as a
problem in Bangladesh in his book Banker to the Poor.3 His response to this problem was
building a microfinance operation called Grameen Bank, which was the first bank to lend
to collateral-less borrowers at fair rates.
Critiques of MF
One main concern of those questioning the promises of microfinance is whether it
is really an alternative to foreign aid. Many proponents of microfinance would say yes.
Yet the scope of microfinance tends to be small and it is of a grassroots nature. The
amount of capital disbursed is minute in comparison to multi-million dollar development
projects carried out by multi- and bi-lateral organizations. In addition, microfinance does
not necessarily benefit those who lack market access.
In truth, microfinance can only benefit the poor when it works. Within certain
programs, deficiencies exist which block the poor from receiving the intended benefits. It
is important that programs minimize these deficiencies so that they can meet their
development goal to help the poor overcome poverty.
2

Gokhale, Ketaki. 2009. “A Global Surge in Tiny Loans Spurs Credit Bubble in a Slum.” The Wall Street Journal.
August 13. Retrieved May 2009 (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125012112518027581.html).
3
Yunus, Muhammad. 1999. Banker to the Poor. New York: PublicAffairs. Page 82
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Critiques of MF: Default Rates
Recently the issue of defaults in microfinance has become a main target for
scrutiny. Defaults are outstanding debts which are not paid on time, and loans are
defaulting when the payment is one or more days late. MFIs must manage risk by
lowering defaults so that they stay financially healthy. This is important because in order
for all borrowers to continue to receive credit opportunities, the overall organizational
health (which depends on individual behavior), must stay in good shape.
Research Question
What explains why some MFIs have high default rates, while others have low
ones?
Dependent Variable and Measurement
My dependent variable is low default rates. High default rates occur when more
than 10% of an MFI’s credit profile is delinquent past 60 days. The 10% figure has been
chosen because this is the industry standard.4 The time frame of 60 days has been chosen
based on the credit ruling for collecting late payments within FINCA CR. It is in line
with that of many other Microfinance Institutions.
Hypotheses
This thesis will test three hypotheses derived from the main ideas in the literature
on microfinance reviewed in chapter 2:

4

According to the Microenterprise Development Team Leader at World Vision. Norell, Dan. “How to Reduce Arrears
in Microfinance Institutions.” Journal of Microfinance volume 3(1). Page 117.
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Hypothesis 1: The more unified the microfinance group, the lower the
level of defaults.



Hypothesis 2: The better trained the members of the microfinance group,
the lower the level of defaults.



Hypothesis 3: The greater the financial discipline imposed on group
members by administrators, the lower the level of defaults.

Admittedly, the hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, but they are sufficiently
distinct that they may be tested in this case study.

Research Design & Case Selection
This project involves a brief country, regional and community history for the Osa
region of Costa Rica, as well as interviews with communal credit enterprise (CCE)
members of a poverty-focused microfinance program called FINCA CR. FINCA CR is a
microfinance training program that trains communities to localize their own economies
by forming CCEs that give out micro loans. Descriptive research will be gathered about
FINCA CR and its program structure, as well as the creation of the five existing CCEs in
the Osa.
I will determine the method of creation of the five CCEs, their practices, and the
leadership structure within each. These five communities are good case studies for
contributing to answering my research question because they all received similar program
implementation yet one program has a default rate of around 71%. Comparing the four

4

CCEs that have low default rates with the one that has high default rates, I aim to
determine what exactly caused this to happen when so many variables were controlled.
Analysis
The empirical materials that I gathered during my research include the General
Accounting Balance and Credit Portfolio of each CCE. In addition, I completed 96 indepth qualitative interviews with board members and other members of each of the five
CCEs in the Osa, and one CCE (not within the Osa) created by FINCA CR which has
been in existence the longest and overcome several near-failures. The accounting
materials will serve as measurement tools for determining programs’ default rates by
measuring their last default rates reported during the summer of 2009. The in-depth
qualitative interviews will serve as observational measures of two things, the actual
situation in each community and the leadership dynamics that exist. I will look at the
actual situation regarding each community’s level of unity and group participation and
the FINCA program elements being implemented. The leadership dynamics refer to the
board administration that is being undertaken, for example, the structure of the board of
each ECC and the information regarding who is responsible for the obligations they have.
Contributions of this Research
Some microfinance programs are unsuccessful while others lead to substantial
development. The purpose of this research is to find the most efficient manner of
program implementation to reduce defaults within a particular structure. By studying the
consistency of program implementation in one region of a country, I seek to pinpoint a
cause for the high default rate that has arisen in one of the five cases.

5

Limitations
One limitation concerns the subjectivity of both the data, and my interpretations
of the data. Most of the data on which I based my rankings came from interviews in
which subjects described relationships and feelings, or their administrative involvement.
There is a great deal of subjectivity involved in the way that I ranked the groups as
unified, well-trained or disciplined. Other observers might well have interpreted the
subjective data in different ways. Given more resources and time, I ideally would have
hired two coders to analyze the data that I used to create rankings.
Second, having only one case at high-risk for failure means that the results of this
study are at best tentative. In addition, the likelihood that several of the hypothesized
independent variables may be present in all three cases means that I may not be able to
say for sure which one is actually causing the results. Nonetheless, the findings may
strengthen the plausibility of one hypothesis and weaken that of others. This at a
minimum suggests that the strengthened hypothesis deserves further testing in other
places

6

Chapter 2- Literature Review and Hypotheses

Microfinance: A Chronological History
Modern microfinance programs first started to appear in the 1970s in Bangladesh,
which is the home of Muhammad Yunus. Yunus is the founder of Bangladesh’s Grameen
Bank and a leader of the microfinance movement. He believes that poor people are
credit-worthy, 5 and therefore that entrepreneurship can be used as a means to lift them
out of poverty. Jonathan Morduch, a prominent academic in the field of economics who
has done extensive research on microfinance, stated that there is a reason for the
excitement about the promise of microfinance. He explained that through Grameen,
Bangladesh has accomplished reaching the poor, and also women, who had been difficult
to reach through other development approaches because of the country’s strong,
conservative Muslim culture.6
The idea expanded west and around the globe. Yunus’s Grameen Model has now
been copied by other MFIs on five continents.7 The 1980s saw a big boom in
microfinance activity in Latin America with the entrance of large international MFIs.
Microfinance experiments implemented in Bolivia and Mexico gained popularity and
quickly moved north. These organizations “cross-pollinated” Grameen’s model, and
worked so well in Latin America that they found their way into the U.S., as well as Africa
and Central Asia.8

5

Yunus, Muhammad. 1999. Banker to the Poor. New York: PublicAffairs. Pages 24-25.
Morduch, Jonathan. 1999. “The Microfinance Promise.” Journal of Economic Literature volume 37(4): 1570-1571.
7
Armendáriz de Aghion, Beatriz and Jonathan Morduch. 2005. The Economics of Microfinance. Cambridge: MIT
Press. Page x.
8
Armendáriz de Aghion, Beatriz and Jonathan Morduch. 2005. The Economics of Microfinance. Cambridge: MIT
Press. Page x.
6
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Microfinance was continually lauded in international development over the next
two decades. It was seen as so transformative that the United Nations named 2005 the
“International Year of Microcredit.” Subsequently, in 2006 Yunus and Grameen Bank
won the Nobel Peace Prize for their effort to reduce poverty in line with the Millennium
Development Goals. This was only the eighth time a non-governmental organization had
ever received the Nobel, another fact which highlights the importance of the award for
international development.
Today microfinance is so well-known that micro loans can be given online by any
public user. The user may lend by making a “purchase” of a micro loan through a website
with a credit card, such as is done on www.KIVA.org. This user can choose which
business to lend the money to and will receive regular updates each time the money is
paid back. In 2009 it was even mentioned in a Christmas day New York Times article on
how people give back during the holidays. 9

The Scope of Impact of Microfinance
All in all, Morduch notes an agreement regarding microfinance, and recognizes
that microfinance has appeared to be win-win from all sides of the political spectrum. He
believes that those who lean left like how it is grassroots, and those who lean right like
how it reinforces the market as a mechanism for alleviating poverty.10 Whether it
“works” is a new question up for debate, and Jude Fernando, an expert on microcredit
and NGO development, agrees that academics have begun to acknowledge this.11

9

Lieber, Ron. 2009. “Doing Good by Paying Forward.” The New York Times, December 25. Retrieved December 26,
2009 (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/26/your-money/26money.html?_r=1&emc=eta1)
10
Murdoch, Jonathan. 1999. “The Microfinance Promise.” Journal of Economic Literature volume 37(4): 1570-1571.
11
Fernando, Jude L. 2006. Microfinance: Perils and Prospects. New York: Routledge. Page 4.
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Ultimately it appears there is not an explanation for the ever-increasing global
expansion of microfinance, yet it has become prevalent in the development sphere. The
Microcredit Summit Campaign (a yearly global conference) reported that at the end of
2002, over 67 million clients had been served by around 2,500 MFIs, and that over 41
million of those were defined as “the poorest” in their respective nations.12 At the end of
2004, MFIs reported having reached over 92 million clients, and over 66 million of these
were below the $1-a-day poverty line when they took out their first loan.13 Since the
World Bank recently changed their lowest poverty line to $1.25,14 it is possible that many
more than 66 million of the world’s poorest have been reached by microfinance.
The Microcredit Summit’s reports are a response to critics’ questioning whether
microfinance actually reaches its intended audience. Skeptics wondered if MFIs were
“cherry-picking” their clients. One researcher implied that microfinance initiatives are
not reaching the expected demographic (the poor), rather that some models with a strong
focus on education are aimed more at middle-income borrowers.15 The reasoning comes
from some MFIs requiring borrowers to participate in certain “educational” programs
with heavy business content, which might be chasing the uneducated away, or even
making them ineligible for loans if they cannot grasp the concepts required. While global

12

Taken from: Armendáriz de Aghion, Beatriz and Morduch, Jonathan. 2005. The Economics of Microfinance.
Cambridge: MIT Press. Page 3.
Original source: Daley-Harris, Sam. 2003. The State of the Microcredit Summit Campaign Report 2003. Washington:
Microcredit Summit. (www.microcreditsummit.org/pubs/reports/socr/2003/socr03_en.pdf).
13
Daley-Harris, Sam. 2005. The State of the Microcredit Summit Campaign Report 2005. Washington: Microcredit
Summit. (http://www.microcreditsummit.org/pubs/reports/socr/2005/SOCR05.pdf).
14
Author Unknown. 2009. People to People. Washington: World Bank.
(http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/wdi09introch2.pdf). Page 5.
15
Chao-Beroff et al. 2000. “A Comparative Analysis of Member-based Microfinance Institutions in East and West
Africa.” Microfinance Gateway. Washington: CGAP. Retrieved October 2009
(http://www.microfinancegateway.org/p/site/m//template.rc/1.9.29583).
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reports show that the “poorest” are indeed being reached,16 this voice of criticism is still
not completely silenced.
Despite the criticisms, microfinance operations are growing in existence. Not all
programs are a success or failure across the board, and it is still difficult to determine
why. Literature has just now begun to merge academic studies with practitioners’
results.17 One key question facing microfinance today is, “what exactly causes a program
to succeed or fail?”

Problems in Microfinance

MFIs claim to achieve development initiatives such as income generation for the
poor. While the claims may be true, a main problem is that a lack of sufficient data exists
to support them. Outcomes that are being reported are not being done so consistently.

Take default rates for example. As of now there is a lack of data related to MFIs’
real default rates, which leaves them wide open to scrutiny. If the poor take out loans but
default on payments then income may not be generated, and it may even end up costing
them in penalty fees. Of the 460 MFIs listed on the MIX, a World Bank clearinghouse for
microfinance information, 200 did not report their default figures. Of those that did report

16

Taken from: Fernando, Jude L. 2006. Microfinance: Perils and Prospects. New York: Routledge. Page 3.
Original source: Daley-Harris, Sam. 2003. The State of the Microcredit Summit Campaign Report 2003. Washington:
Microcredit Summit. (www.microcreditsummit.org/pubs/reports/socr/2003/socr03_en.pdf).
17
Armendáriz de Aghion, Beatriz and Jonathan Morduch. 2005. The Economics of Microfinance. Cambridge: MIT
Press. Page x.
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figures, the numbers ranged from default rates of 4.76% to 63.65%.18 The two distinct
problems here are a lack of default records and the immense percentage range of defaults.

Critiques of MF: Default Rates
Recently the issue of defaults in microfinance has become a main target for
scrutiny. Defaults occur for many reasons including: ignorance among members of the
program, lack of year-round formal employment, confusion within families about who is
responsible for the loan, and hasty and improper group formation. 19 A large amount of
literature on the topic shows that any of these problems may be prevalent. The main
theme is that MFIs must manage risk. It is important that MFIs overcome these obstacles
in order to curb default rates, so that income is properly generated and MFI reputability is
upheld.
If the answer to a loan default were as simple as taking legal action to recover the
loss, the missing funds would be quickly recovered and perhaps the lesson to avoid
default would be quickly learned. But defaults are a problem because in many cases they
cannot be collected within developing country structures. “Poor people lack the assets to
back-up their loans, and poor countries lack civil infrastructure, such as adequate court
systems, to collect bad debt.”20
When one single borrower defaults on payment, the action multiplies. An
individual default comes from a single borrower. The borrower has an individual default
18

Author Unknown. 2006. “The Risky Business of Borrower Default in Calculating MicroFinance Interest Rates.”
Microcapital Monitor. Retrieved October 2008 (http://microcapitalmonitor.com/cblog/index.php?/archives/139-TheRisky-Business-of-Borrower-Default-in-Calculating-MicroFinance-Interest-Rates.html).
19
Author Unknown. 1997. “Causes of Default in Microcredit Association for Social Advancement (ASA).”
Microfinance Gateway. Bangladesh: ASA. Retrieved October 2008
(http://www.microfinancegateway.org/p/site/m//template.rc/1.9.24650).
20
Author Unknown. 2006. “The Risky Business of Borrower Default in Calculating MicroFinance Interest Rates.”
Microcapital Monitor. Retrieved October 2008 (http://microcapitalmonitor.com/cblog/index.php?/archives/139-TheRisky-Business-of-Borrower-Default-in-Calculating-MicroFinance-Interest-Rates.html).
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when their payment is not made on time- by them, one of their cosigners, or group
members who have promised to insure them. The problem is not just a single individual
defaulting, but one single default can result in the domino effect. Once MFIs have high
numbers of such individuals within their overall portfolio, they reach bad financial health.
In this study defaults are being explored in the group context.
Since micro borrowers now solicit loans in amounts larger than those being
offered by their MFI, some MFIs will act as a middle man between the borrower and a
larger institution, and this is the case with FINCA CR. This is where defaulting will
become especially scrutinized by the larger (and usually formal) institutions. If an MFI
has a high default rate among borrowers, those borrowers that do have good credit and
would like to solicit larger loans will be denied based on their institution’s profile. Larger
lending institutions measure smaller institution’s financial health in order to determine if
they are worthy of credit. There is a certain default rate at which the larger bank will deny
credit to an applicant. This varies between 10-15%.

Reducing Defaults
The literature on defaults outlines several ways of minimizing defaulted payments
in microfinance. The hypotheses in my study are derived from these main ideas. These
are: creating a highly-unified structure/group sentiment within MFIs, implementing good
quality training programs, and exerting discipline in financial administration. These three
methods will be explored here.

12

Highly-Unified Structure/Group Sentiment
I define “unified” to mean that the group members are of the sentiment that they
are part of a group and have obligations as a group member. Katharine Rankin, a
microfinance expert, says that the theory was popularized by sociologist Robert Putnam.
The idea is that characteristics of social ties such as trust will facilitate “coordinated
actions,” and, “when people engage in …forms of association, the argument goes, they
develop a framework of common values and beliefs” that can be what holds the
community together. Groups are created because members know each other; therefore
they feel confident in depending on others to follow particular roles. In microfinance,
these members are usually peers from the same circle of friends or community, and know
each other’s behaviour.
In essence, one would not be chosen by the group unless the group knew them
and knew that they could trust them, presumably because they have some knowledge
about the person’s background and behaviour that a bank (or outside organization) would
not. Groups know that their members will behave in the interest of the group. In unified
groups, borrowers screen other borrowers and only trustworthy individuals may join the
group.21 Rankin states that, “the trust that emerges from common understanding will in
turn generate norms of reciprocity… whereby individual opportunism leaves common
property resources under-cultivated.”22
Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch describe the method of group success to be,
“groups that trust more and cheat less will do better,” and they describe the groups that
21

Gine, Xavier and Dean Karlan. 2009. “Group Versus Individual Liability: Long Term Evidence from Philippine
Microcredit Lending Groups.” EconLit. Working paper. Economic Growth Center, Yale University. Retrieved
December 2009 (http://www.microfinancegateway.org/p/site/m//template.rc/1.9.37881).
22
Quote by Katharine Rankin from: Fernando, Jude L. 2006. Microfinance: Perils and Prospects. New York:
Routledge. Page 91.

13

trust more as being characterized by “pre-existing social ties.”23 The logic behind this
method is that borrowers are “enticed” to repay because of a “threat of social sanctions”
from their group members.24 In other words, members who know each other are more
likely to encourage or shame one another into paying on time.
Being a part of the group is what gives the individuals access to credit (since they
lack collateral) and in order for all members to remain in good standing, all members
must be paying on time.25
This practice was first used for microfinance by Grameen and has been replicated
by MFIs worldwide. The idea has taken many forms, which are very similar to the
Grameen method. Some MFIs will only lend to groups with joint-liability mechanisms,
which depend on the logic of unity (i.e., if the debtor does not pay, another group
member must take full responsibility, so groups only form among individuals who knew
and trusted each other previously. They must trust each other to be certain that they won’t
have to make someone else’s payment). Grameen attributes its success rate to this
method.26 FINCA CR similarly requires borrowers to get other group members to co-sign
their loan and pay in case of default,27 but CCEs as a whole should also feel unified and

23

Armendáriz de Aghion, Beatriz and Jonathan Morduch. 2005. The Economics of Microfinance. Cambridge: MIT
Press. Page 103.
24
Wydick, Bruce. 2000. “Group Lending under Dynamic Incentives as a Borrower Discipline Device.”Microfinance
Gateway. San Francisco: University of San Francisco- Review of Development Economics. Retrieved July 2009
(http://www.microfinancegateway.org/p/site/m//template.rc/1.9.37583).
25
Westley, Glenn. 2004. “A Tale of Four Village Banking Programs.” Microfinance Gateway. Washington: InterAmerican Development Bank. Retrieved July 2009
(http://www.microfinancegateway.org/p/site/m//template.rc/1.9.27393).
26
Taken from: Simtowe, Franklin. 2006. “Determinants of Intra-group Insurance in Microfinance: Empirical Evidence
from Joint Liability Lending Schemes in Malawi.” Microfinance Gateway. Germany: University of Bonn. Retrieved
December 2008 (http://www.microfinancegateway.org/p/site/m//template.rc/1.9.27282).
Original source: Besley, Timothy and Stephen Coate. 1995. “Group lending, repayment incentives and social
collateral.” Journal of Development Economics volume 46(1).
27
Quirós, Rodolfo, and Claudio Gonzalez-Vega. 2007. “Institutional transformation to create linkages that enhance
rural Access to financial services: the case of the Fundación Integral Campesina (FINCA) in Costa Rica.” New York:
The Ford Foundation. Retrieved April 9, 2009
(http://www.ruralfinance.org/servlet/CDSServlet?status=ND0zODg1MS41MjU5OSY2PWVuJjMzPWRvY3VtZW50c
yZzaG93Q2hpbGRyZW49dHJ1ZSYzNz1pbmZv).
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be of the “group sentiment,” since the entire group will lose dividends and will not have
money to loan if borrowers do not pay. Group sentiment and trust is imperative to group
members. Without trust, individuals would be rejected, because other members have no
way of knowing if they would act in accordance with the rules.
Cases of unified group structures are seen throughout the literature. FINCA
Nicaragua (a branch of FINCA International) and Compartamos (Mexico) have
“solidarity groups.” These are unified groups that they say offer more flexibility and less
risk in the lending process because of the insurance that members provide each other, and
are considered a key factor in high repayment rates. 28 A study from Guatemala showed
that the peer monitoring inherent in the group structure was a main factor in timely
repayment.29 Another study done in India also reports that the group structure is
significantly important to the high repayment rates they found. This study included
statistics based on why group members repaid on time. It said that 42% of group
members repaid on time because they knew the group would suffer otherwise, that 17%
felt it was their moral duty, and that 8% did not want group pressure. Along with other
statistics, the study concluded that 25% of the reason for high repayment rates was group
accountability, and another 38% was the fact that people attend the meetings. These
meetings strengthen groups’ social solidarity, as they offer a place where group members
can be constantly reinforcing duties and empowering members.30

28

Westley, Glenn. 2004. “A Tale of Four Village Banking Programs.” Microfinance Gateway. Washington: InterAmerican Development Bank. Retrieved July 2009
(http://www.microfinancegateway.org/p/site/m//template.rc/1.9.27393). Page 2.
29
Wydick, Bruce. 2000. “Group Lending under Dynamic Incentives as a Borrower Discipline Device.”Microfinance
Gateway. San Francisco: University of San Francisco- Review of Development Economics. Retrieved July 2009
(http://www.microfinancegateway.org/p/site/m//template.rc/1.9.37583). Page 3.
30
Bedoya, Guadalupe. 2006. “Exploratory Work in Orissa: Who is the Marginal Client for Microfinance? Why Do
People Repay So Well?” Microfinance Gateway. India: Institute for Financial Management and Research- Centre for
Micro Finance. Retrieved 2009 (http://www.microfinancegateway.org/p/site/m//template.rc/1.9.26435). Page 16.

15

Based on the foregoing logic as discussed in the literature, I hypothesize that the
more unified the microfinance group, the lower the level of defaults (Hypothesis 1).

Good-Quality Training Programs
Another method of reducing defaults to date is implementing good quality
training programs which create more knowledgeable group members. This method was
developed as evidence started to appear that ignorant group members could potentially
increase the risk associated with microfinance. The idea is that having group members
who are educated in small business skills increases the chance that members will follow
the rules and make payments on time.
Many MFIs support the idea that borrowers need good training and support.
Yunus’s “plus” programs are education programs that are required by Grameen. These
trainings exist because Grameen does not function on the belief that all poor people are
automatically capable of bootstrap success. Supplemental trainings serve to empower
group members in a way that will also benefit the MFI. Grameen will not even begin
lending to borrowers until they are fully trained on financial and repayment basics and
been approved by their loan officer. FINCA CR has also taken measures to improve their
training program within the last 15 years in an attempt to train every member in basic
business practices.31 They believe that if every member is trained, even if they are not
responsible for administration, they are capable of supporting the group member who is.

31

Quirós, Rodolfo, and Claudio Gonzalez-Vega. 2007. “Institutional transformation to create linkages that enhance
rural Access to financial services: the case of the Fundación Integral Campesina (FINCA) in Costa Rica.” New York:
The Ford Foundation. Retrieved April 9, 2009
(http://www.ruralfinance.org/servlet/CDSServlet?status=ND0zODg1MS41MjU5OSY2PWVuJjMzPWRvY3VtZW50c
yZzaG93Q2hpbGRyZW49dHJ1ZSYzNz1pbmZv).
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FINCA Peru (a branch of FINCA International) completed an in-depth study of
training programs. In their study, two borrower groups were chosen. One group received
financial training for 1-2 years while the other served as a control group, only making
contact with the MFI when loan transactions were occurring. The training was based on
practical examples of best business practices. The study found that the group that
received training showed “greater business knowledge…which did translate to better
business practices.” The study also found that higher repayment rates were a positive
impact of the training programs, and both the borrower and the MFI benefitted from their
existence. Moreover, it was found that the amount of money made up in client retention
and high repayment rates was double the amount of the trainings themselves- so the
program could pay for itself.32 Another study focused on rural capacity building in India
implemented training programs amongst entrepreneurs who had just begun borrowing. It
claimed that at the start of the study the borrowers had yet to earn income from their
starting investment. At completion it attributed the 83% who had begun earning incomes,
and had moved out of the “below poverty line,” to the training programs.33
Based on the foregoing logic as discussed in the literature, I hypothesize that the
better trained the members of the microfinance group, the lower the level of defaults
(Hypothesis 2).

32

Frisancho, V. et al. 2008. “Business Training for Microfinance Clients: How it Matters and for Whom?”Microfinance
Gateway. Québec , Canada: Poverty & Economic Policy Research Network. Retrieved June 2009
(http://www.microfinancegateway.org/p/site/m//template.rc/1.9.30264).
33
Soami, R., and A. Jha. 2004. “Creating Rural Entrepreneurs 2000-2004.” Microfinance Gateway. India: SRT Rural
Institute. Retrieved January 2010 (http://www.microfinancegateway.org/p/site/m//template.rc/1.9.24338).

17

Discipline
There is also a recurring idea in the literature that the greater the financial
discipline imposed on group members by administrators, the lower the level of defaults.
Armendáriz de Aguion and Morduch stated that, “a great deal of what separates failed
microfinance from successful microfinance ultimately has to do with management.” They
also quote Woller and Schreiner in a finding saying that “administrative efficiency… and
loan officer productivity [i.e. collecting payments on time and collecting late fees]” is a
“significant determinant of self-sufficiency.”34 In addition, an analysis on thirteen village
banks equally showed that efficiency in financial administration and loan officer
productivity are determinants of financial sustainability in MFIs.35 These indicate
discipline because if administrators and loan officers are efficient, the rules are followed,
and money is distributed/collected on time, and if not, late fees are paid as a form of
punishment. These are the duties of administrators/money collectors- making sure that
the money is where it is supposed to be.
In the microfinance literature, effective financial control means immediate
feedback on defaulted payments.36 I define financial discipline in two ways: 1) Paying on
time in accordance with the rules, and 2) Paying a late fee on defaulted payments as a
method of correction and training. The logic behind this idea is that by punishing
delinquent borrowers the MFI anticipates and stops “the domino effect” from occurring,

34

Armendáriz de Aghion, Beatriz and Jonathan Morduch. 2005. The Economics of Microfinance. Cambridge: MIT
Press. Pages 257-259.
35
Taken from: Armendáriz de Aghion, Beatriz and Jonathan Morduch. 2005. The Economics of Microfinance.
Cambridge: MIT Press.
Original cite: Woller, Gary, and Mark Schreiner. 2003. “Poverty lending, financial self-sufficiency, and the six aspects
of outreach.” Working paper, Marriot School. Salt Lake City: Brigham Young University.
36
Westley, Glenn. 2004. “A Tale of Four Village Banking Programs.” Microfinance Gateway. Washington: InterAmerican Development Bank. Retrieved July 2009
(http://www.microfinancegateway.org/p/site/m//template.rc/1.9.27393). Page 28.
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i.e. they show other borrowers that this is not accepted. Exercising financial discipline in
microfinance sets precedent for future borrowers.
One of Grameen’s borrower mantras is discipline, which is emphasized for all
borrowers. Grameen supports its social agenda through this methodology, which is
reinforced by and derived from the “sixteen decisions” (affirmational lifestyle statements)
that empower and train program participants to act in certain ways.37 The idea is that one
who is personally disciplined will be disciplined in all aspects of life. In a comparative
study of Kashf Foundation and Grameen the analyst notes that at Grameen, “discipline is
highly emphasized during… training, with the assigned loan officer testing and quizzing
members to ensure their suitability for the program.” She notes that Grameen believes
that this holistic approach to discipline creates success.38 MFIs put focus on repayment
rates, and most if not all require penalty fees on late payments. This fact shows that it is
apparent that both on-time payments and penalty fees are popular. But discipline must be
employed in order to ensure viability of this method. Once one person pays late, and does
not pay a penalty, the word spreads. MFIs put the focus on repayment rates to show the
world that microfinance can work.
A study on microfinance in Italy found that individual incentives for repaying on
time depend on the penalty incurred by not repaying. The study also found a direct
correlation between weak credit standards and higher default rates.39 Two microfinance
analysts also did a study comparing which method might be more effective in reducing

37

Yunus, Muhammad. 2007. Creating a World Without Poverty. New York: PublicAffairs. Page 58.
Syed, Nabiha. 2005. “Factors of Success: A Comparative Study of Kashf Foundation and Grameen Bank.”
Microfinance Gateway. Baltimore: John Hopkins University. Retrieved 2009
(http://www.microfinancegateway.org/p/site/m//template.rc/1.9.24231). Page 8.
39
Grant, Charles and Mario Padula. 2007. “Bounds on repayment behavior: evidence for the consumer credit market.”
Microfinance Gateway. Italy: Ca’Foscari University of Venice. Retrieved 2009
(http://www.microfinancegateway.org/p/site/m//template.rc/1.9.24167).
38
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defaults, harsh penalties or moderate consequences. It concluded that under a “wide
array” of circumstances, punishments “harsh enough to ensure repayment” positively
affected borrower welfare.40
Based on the foregoing logic as discussed in the literature, I hypothesize that the
greater the financial discipline imposed on group members by administrators, the lower
the level of defaults (Hypothesis 3).

Conclusion
Now that each prominent theory has been explained in detail, I will apply the
hypotheses derived from them to my research question, explaining default rates. Before
doing so, I will briefly describe the test communities in chapter 3.

40

Tam, Xuan et al. 2009. “Are Harsh Penalties for Default Really Better?” Microfinance Gateway. Richmond: The
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. Retrieved 2009
(http://www.microfinancegateway.org/p/site/m//template.rc/1.9.37594).
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Chapter 3- FINCA: History, Scope, and Communal Credit Enterprises

Introduction
This chapter will provide background information on FINCA CR. The
organization’s history and methodology will be explored, and we will read an example of
successful community program implementation. I will continue by introducing the five
communities of the Osa peninsula, which I will use to test my the three hypotheses later.

The Origins of FINCA CR
FINCA CR was originally a part of FINCA International. FINCA International is
one of the big international MFIs that started the trend of microfinance in Latin America,
and in Costa Rica. 41 The FINCA International model failed in Costa Rica because it was
not able to recover payments for money that it lent. 42 The direct cause of this failure was
not clear, but the funds were never recuperated. Once this model failed in Costa Rica, a
groundbreaking microfinance evolution occurred.
FINCA International founder John Hatch met Maria Marta Padilla, the soon-to-be
founder of FINCA CR. FINCA CR decided to follow FINCA International’s method with
one exception; they cut capital injections into village banks. Instead, they began training
village banks to raise their own capital, and transformed them into legal business

41

Quirós, Rodolfo, and Claudio Gonzalez-Vega. “Institutional transformation to create linkages that enhance rural
Access to financial services: the case of the Fundación Integral Campesina (FINCA) in Costa Rica.” Rural Finance
Learning Centre. The Ford Foundation, 2007. Web. 09 Apr. 2009.
http://www.ruralfinance.org/servlet/CDSServlet?status=ND0zODg1MS41MjU5OSY2PWVuJjMzPWRvY3VtZW50cy
ZzaG93Q2hpbGRyZW49dHJ1ZSYzNz1pbmZv.
42
Paxton, Julia et al. “Case Study of FINCA Costa Rica.” The World Bank, Sustainable Banking with the Poor. 1997.
Web 2008.
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entities.43 The logic behind this change is, if the money belongs to the villagers, they are
more likely to take care of it.
FINCA CR is not an MFI, it is a microfinance training program. According to a
FINCA CR staff member, the organization solicits grants from banks and corporations to
cover the cost of its funding, and it acts as a nonprofit organization. 44 Administration
costs are largely spent on field workers that move into communities and facilitate
business trainings for the village banks. The village banks that FINCA CR creates and
trains are MFIs.
In essence, these innovative village banks completely localize their own
economies by growing their own seed capital. FINCA CR trains the village banks to sell
shares of their own company to community members, and use the funds from shares to
make micro loans. With the loan interest earned, the business grows, dividends are paid
to shareholders, and the village MFI achieves two important initiatives. These two
initiatives are reducing poverty through entrepreneurism, and in cases where
entrepreneurial loans are not taken, increasing savings among the poor.

FINCA CR Methodology

The methodology has been constantly evolving since it began. FINCA CR
identifies potential rural communities through their regional field workers. These regional
trainers work in several communities within one province or area of the country. They
can be assigned to work with anywhere from three to ten communities. They travel
43

Paxton, Julia et al. “Case Study of FINCA Costa Rica.” The World Bank, Sustainable Banking with the Poor. 1997.
Web 2008.
44
Interview with Luis Jimenez on August 12, 2009. Transcribed.
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between these communities, and because the areas are rural, they tend to know the areas
and the people well. Once they indicate that it would make sense to begin working in a
community, FINCA CR gets in touch with the local development association of that
community. The local development association hosts an open town meeting so that
FINCA CR may present their initiative.
After this meeting interested community members, who generally include one or
more members from the development association, decide to form a group to receive
training. FINCA CR recommends that groups of 10-15 people (minimum) decide to start
the project. Since FINCA CR works in rural communities, people tend to know each
other. Furthermore, people that attend open (or any) meetings of the development
association would typically know each other because of their interest in community
involvement. Groups are formed between people that know each other, and they enter
into the group contract because they have trust for other participants based on previous
experiences. FINCA CR stresses the importance of creating a group with strong social
ties, because they believe that in order for a group to be successful, they need to feel like
a group and understand their obligations to the group. In other words, they too believe in
Hypothesis 1. For this reason, only community members are eligible to join.
The base training methodology relies on 22 sessions (like workshops) that
community members must participate in. According to FINCA CR, ideally the groups
would receive one year of follow-up support from a regional field worker as well to help
with the more complex details that arise in business accounting. This is completely
dependent on funding. FINCA CR’s funding is not consistent because it is based on
grants. Grants are generally given to be used in one particular area of the country.
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Regional program implementation differs based on this detail, but the core methodology,
based on the 22 steps, stays the same throughout the country.
After they finish training, groups are officially inaugurated by FINCA CR. These
innovative village bank businesses are referred to as Communal Credit Enterprises
(CCEs). They hold an official ceremony to which the entire town is invited, and the
founding members are presented the paper documents for their shares. These members
are the original shareholders of the village banks, and by selling additional shares to their
fellow community members they come up with enough seed capital to give a few loans.
The point of the ceremony is to present the CCE to the community. The idea is that once
other community members see the CCE functioning, they will gain interest and invest in
shares.45

Scope of FINCA CR

According to FINCA CR staff, over two-hundred CCEs exist, in most regions of
Costa Rica. The oldest CCE still standing has been in existence almost fourteen years.46
New CCEs are still being formed today. To get an idea of the possibilities that exist for
CCEs, one can look at an older CCE. According to FINCA CR staff, CCE Sacrín (located
in San Cristobal Norte just south of the nation’s capital) is a model CCE. It started around
14 years ago and has overcome several near failures. According to the group’s president,
the near failures occurred because of financial confusion; members felt that they could

45

According to a FINCA CR document (training manual for Peace Corps Volunteers) and interview with Travis Bays,
August 6, 2009. Transcribed.
46
CCE Sacrín, located in San Cristobal Norte de Cartago, in the Central Valley Highlands.
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not depend on FINCA CR for additional capacity building in moments of need.47
Subsequently some of the board members became de-motivated with their positions.
FINCA CR happened to receive funding for some out-of-town (and country) conferences,
and invited the group members to attend. The board members report this as being the
reason that they became re-motivated and fell in love with their CCE. Now it is a
successful agent for economic development in its community. Before it began, San
Cristobal Norte was a community comprised of mostly agricultural workers. Some were
coffee farmers and some were coffee pickers. They had few economic opportunities
outside of this because of a lack of capital. According to Sacrín’s president, it was not a
rich community.48 According to FINCA CR documents, CCE Sacrín started by managing
around $400 USD of credit and today manages around $40,000 USD of its own capital,
along with owning shares in larger financial institutions, making its total assets worth
more than $160,000 USD.49 The loan default rate is minimal.
Yet not all CCEs have been completely successful, and little to no data has been
compiled regarding the complete history of CCE financial failures. For this reason I
chose to do a study of CCEs in one region of Costa Rica, the Osa peninsula. I was made
aware that of the five communities operating CCEs in this region, four were financially
healthy while one had bad financial health, shown through high default rates.

47

FINCA CR operated on a much lower budget when it started out. CCE Sacrín did receive 21 of the 22 trainings.
They did not receive the one-year follow-up training, and in addition, reported that they completely lost contact with
FINCA CR for two years after, at which time this financial confusion occurred.
48
Interview with Luis Cordero, President of CCE Sacrin, on August 10, 2009. Transcribed.
49
According to a FINCA CR document.
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FINCA CR in the Osa Peninsula, Costa Rica
This study will examine the Osa region of Costa Rica. The Osa Peninsula is one
of the most secluded regions of the country. It is located in the southwest corner of the
country on the Pacific Ocean. The dominant industries in this region are eco-tourism
(tourism is Costa Rica’s largest single industry)50, fishing, agricultural production
(mainly palm oil) and the maritime industry. All five communities in the Osa region
share some combination of these industries, and all are accessible by various forms of
transportation, including car, bus and boat. In addition, all are considered to be rural
communities of less than 3,000 inhabitants. Since program implementation in this area is
fairly new, the five CCEs that exist in the region had been operating for less than three
years when the study began.
The five CCEs are located in the following communities: Bahia Ballena, Sierpe,
Ciudad Cortes, La Palma and Puerto Jimenez. Each is classified as being a young CCE;
the oldest is now just over three years old. As of December 2009, each CCE has been
formally inaugurated and has been giving loans for a time period of at least one year. All
received program implementation via the same base methodology. That is, all received
FINCA CR trainings in order to be officially formed as CCEs.51

CCE Characteristics

As noted above, the five test CCEs are found in communities that share certain
common characteristics. In addition to these controlled community variables, the CCEs

50
51

CIA World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cs.html.
Based on information from interview with Travis Bays on August 6, 2009 (Transcribed) and my observations.
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themselves share other elements, allowing me to control for potentially confounding
variables. The following charts illustrate these basic characteristics of the five CCEs.

CCE members
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Figure 3.1 52

As figure 3.1 shows, all of the CCEs have a small number of participants, ranging
from 31 to 48.53 The demographics of the CCEs are similar for the most part. With one
exception, the CCEs have relatively equal numbers of men and women. The exception
group (CCE Golfo Dulce in Puerto Jimenez) has only five men of its 31 members.54 In
addition the majority of founding group members had ages within around 10 years of
each other.

52

Figures gathered from interviews and according to administrative board members of the CCEs.
See the limitations section of chapter seven for further discussion regarding possible implications of group
populations versus differences in total assets.
54
Phone interview with Deybia Cortes, Secretary of CCE Golfo Dulce in Puerto Jimenez, on January 28, 2010.
Transcribed.
53
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Figure 3.2 shows that each group started in the same 1.5 year time frame, from
mid-year 2006 to the end of 2008. Community documents show that all CCEs started
with a similar amount of seed capital, around $400-500.56 This money was raised by
selling shares valued at $10 to group members. A requisite for group membership is the
purchase of one share. In each case, many founding members bought several shares.

55

Dates are according to administrative board members of the CCEs. On this chart Ciudad Cortes appears to be the
oldest of the CCEs. This CCE was improperly formed at the founding date. It existed for almost two years under bad
financial administration. More information is detailed in the community descriptions.
56
According to transcribed interviews with each board and financial documents.
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Figure 3.3 shows that the current amount of local capital ranges from almost
$2,300 to just under $9,000, figures which vary for the most part according to the amount
of time that each CCE has been in existence.

57

Data gathered from General Accounting Balances. Local Cash is the capital that CCEs raised by selling shares.
Outside capital becomes available when CCEs use local capital to buy shares in a larger financial institution. Once a
CCE does this, it has access to bigger pools of funds which it can borrow, and in turn lend to its members. The larger
financial institution in this case, EDESA, functions the same as the CCE itself. Therefore a CCE buys a share in
EDESA, has access to a larger pool of credit, pays interest on money borrowed and receives dividends on its share at
the end of the year. Shares in EDESA are approximately $100 each. If the other four CCEs purchase shares as Bahia
Ballena did (and as they are now beginning to), they could potentially be this large within another year to year and a
half, depending on how many loans they give in their respective communities.
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Figure 3.458

Figure 3.4 shows a ranking of local assets per CCE member for each community.
CCEs were ranked 1-5 based on the amount of local assets that they had per member, one
being the least number of assets and five being the highest number of assets per member.
The ranking showed that Bahia Ballena had the highest number of local assets per
member. Possible implications of this finding are discussed in the limitations section of
the thesis conclusion.
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Data gathered from CCE documents.

30

Rank of assets per member

Total assets per CCE member
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Bahia
Ballena

Sierpe

La Palma

Puerto
Jimenez

Ciudad
Cortes

CCE Community

Figure 3.559

Figure 3.5 shows a ranking of total assets per CCE member for each community.
CCEs were also ranked 1-5 based on the amount of total assets that they had per member,
one being the least number of assets and five being the highest number of assets per
member. The ranking showed that Bahia Ballena had the highest number of total assets
per member as well. Again, possible implications of this finding are discussed in the
limitations section of the thesis conclusion.

59

Data gathered from CCE documents.
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Last, figure 3.6 shows that average loan sizes in communities range from $300$1500, so all are considered micro loans.

The five CCEs also show differing characteristics, related to default rates. Each
CCE tracks their default rates on a document called the credit profile, which shows all
outstanding loans and the most current payment status. The payment status can be: paid,
between 1-30 days late, between 30-60 days late, between 60-90 days late, and more than
90 days late. Starting with figure 3.5, the following charts show the long-term default
rates for each CCE during the months of August and December. Since I am measuring
default rates, the conclusions to my hypotheses are based on these charts, as will be seen
in the following chapters.

60

Data gathered from loan profiles.
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In December 2009 and January 2010, I collected default information for the
month of December 2009. This additional snapshot of CCE default rates serves to add
data to the study. It not only measures what happened in Bahia Ballena (the only CCE
with bad financial health), but also if the other CCEs experienced default rates that may
be pertinent to my hypotheses. After becoming aware of its financial situation in August,
Bahia Ballena stopped granting loans. Therefore, for this CCE, all December information
relates to loans whose information was shown in the August data.
The following charts illustrate differing characteristics of the five CCEs, related to

Of defaulting loans, % over 60 days late

the dependent variable- default rates.
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In August 2009, Ciudad Cortes’s 14% default rate had not yet reached the 30-day mark.
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Puerto
Jimenez

Figure 3.7 shows the percentage of defaults that were overdue past 60 days in
each CCE during August 2009. Since Bahia Ballena was the only community to have

Of defaulting loans, % over 60 days late

long-term defaults during this month, the 22.6% figure is the only one shown.
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Figure 3.8 shows the percentage of defaults that were overdue past 60 days in
each CCE during the same month. Since Bahia Ballena was the only CCE to have longterm defaults during this month, the 45.7% figure is the only one shown.
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In December 2009, the other four communities’ default rates were for payments overdue less than 30 days.
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Conclusion

In the following chapters I compare the group structures, training programs
received, and amount of discipline employed in each CCE in order to see if any of these
factors are associated with Bahia Ballena having high default rates. These hypotheses are
not mutually exclusive, but nevertheless they may present interesting findings on the
potential causes of high default rates.
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Chapter 4- The Effects of a Highly-Unified Structure

Introduction
This chapter tests Hypothesis 1: the more unified the microfinance group, the
lower the level of defaults. I start with the operationalization of my variables, and then
test each of the five CCEs in order to determine if the evidence supports this hypothesis.
Last, I describe the limitations of this hypothesis.

Operationalizing Hypothesis 1: THE MORE UNIFIED THE MF GROUP, THE
LOWER THE LEVEL OF DEFAULTS.
By “unified” I mean that the group members had bonds of solidarity among each
other prior to formation of the CCE. This may be because they were friends, neighbors,
or members of other small-scale organizations such as their local church. CCE groups are
formed on this basis of pre-existing trust and cohesiveness.
In this study I set out to measure the degree of unity for each of the five CCEs. In
order to do this, I collected data on past associations, and data on attitudes toward the
group. I interviewed a portion of CCE members from each community. These interviews
are the source of my data.63 Information on past association was confirmed by crosschecking with other respondents. Interviewees were selected randomly, but based on
availability to participate in interviews.64

63

Pursuant to IRB approval, I hold all signed consent forms in a locked box in my possession. The interviews will be
destroyed following this study.
64
See the Limitations section of this chapter for more details.
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The data on past associations concerns the extent to which the CCE members
knew each other before formalizing the group. I interviewed several members from each
CCE in order to determine the degree of unity. I triangulated the information received in
order to judge the unity of, and rank, each group in order. Questions that I asked
included: How do the founding members know each other? In what capacity had they
worked together in the past? 65
The data on attitudes toward the group that I collected concerns the extent to which
the interviewees believe that they are a part of a group and have obligations to that group,
not just that they are participating in something as individuals and for individual benefit.
To measure this aspect I administered a survey that sought to measure interviewees’
motivation for joining the group. Questions (and follow-up questions) included: Why did
you decide to buy shares and become a group member? Do you feel that you have
responsibilities as a group member? (If it was not about being in a community group or
was not clear, I responded with): Have you always been involved in community groups?
If not, could say something more about why you became interested in the CCE?66 The
answers serve as a supplemental measure of the overall knowledge of group roles and
obligations.

Degrees of Unity:
In order to measure the degrees of unity, I briefly explain the responses from the
past association measurement questions (How do the founding members know each
other? In what capacity had they worked together in the past?). Next I rank each CCE

65
66

See Appendix 1 for a complete list of questions asked.
See Appendix 1.
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from one to five in terms of unity, one being least unified and five being most unified.
The ranking is chosen based on the data given on past associations.
In order to rank the CCEs, I chose to create a breakdown of types of unity, based
on different reasons for why the CCE members are unified and may have decided to start
the groups. The stronger bonds are those which are characterized by spending more time
together, and purposely participating in activities together. Therefore, friendship and
family relation bares heavier weight on the notion of unity, and then repeated past contact
or friendly involvement, and last proximity in the community. By creating rankings, I am
able to compare the levels of unity to the default rates in order to see if the level of unity
may be associated with high default rates.

Community History- Data on Past Association:
Puerto Jimenez was ranked one for the lowest level of unity of the five CCEs. I
made several observations during my research that led me to this conclusion. First, CCE
members are much more spread out than others. Most members live anywhere from eight
streets to eight kilometers away from their fellow members. The president and the
treasurer live eight kilometers apart.67 Founding members here came from all corners of
the community. Most were individuals that had been involved in community associations
for years.
The founding members knew each other in this way or through being family of
active community participants. Mario Cambronero, the CCE’s president, confirmed this
when he stated, “I’ve been involved in many different associations over the years. I know
Salma, Maureen and Carlos from those. I know Estarlin because he has the mini-grocery
67

Interview with Maureen Ortiz Mosquera on July 24, 2009. Transcribed.
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store, and I generally know the other members, but we don’t really spend time together
outside of the CCE.”68
The members had trust for each other based on community reputations, but this
trust was more based on faith than behavioral proof. Board member Estarlin, a local
grocery-store owner, explained his involvement with other CCE members by saying, “I
have this grocery store and some other businesses so they keep me pretty busy. I do know
most of the others on the CCE because we are all from this town, but I don’t really have
time to be involved in many things outside of my businesses. Now that I’m on the CCE
that is changing, and I’m starting to know more people.”69
Another store owner from the other side of town, Maria de la Cruz, told me how
she has contact with other CCE members through her sales, but that she does not carry
out friendships with any of them because of her heavy work load.70 When she came to the
CCE meeting she sat in an area alone, not next to any other member. At least three of the
thirteen meeting attendees did the same. In addition, I encountered at least seven other
members (aside from Maria and Estarlin) at the meeting who considered themselves to be
less-involved community members. Maureen, the CCE’s treasurer, stated that her
purpose for joining the group was to become more involved and that she wanted to work
closer with other community members aside from through the school where she works.71
Based on these observations I find Puerto Jimenez to be the least unified CCE.
The CCE is comprised primarily of different professionals around the community, who
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Interview from July 18, 2009. Transcribed.
71
Interview from July 24, 2009. Transcribed.
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know and have high opinions of each other, but do not spend time together outside of the
CCE.

La Palma was ranked two as a less-unified community. I made several
observations during my research that led me to this conclusion. First, members are not
friends for the large part, and few members had previously worked together as part of an
association. The CCE’s secretary Angela confirmed this when she said, “I wouldn’t say
that we are very unified. We all know each other because this is a very small town and so
people know each other. I would say that we are friends because we all choose to live
here, but we don’t see each other frequently, we don’t have coffee every day.”72 They are
mainly unified because of their close proximity to each other and because they have
maintained civil relations since they can remember.
The eldest member of the group, Esmeralda, described the civil relations
connecting her to the town as, “they know me because I am from here. I also sell bread
and empanadas at their houses, and every time there is a community activity.”73 They
live in such close vicinity (this is the smallest of the five CCE towns with an area of
about one km squared) that it seems this woman knew everyone in town through her
bread sales.
Because this community is smaller and much closer together than the others, the
members knew each other’s histories, trusted each other, and attended community
activities together, but they were not necessarily friends that kept up with each other daily
or weekly. Ana Luisa, another founding member, described her friendship with other

72
73

Phone interview from January 25, 2010. Transcribed.
Interview with Esmeralda Alvarez Corales on July 21, 2009. Transcribed.
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CCE members as deriving from working “together over the years in school and
community activities.”74 The group’s treasurer said, “I would say that people already
know me because I am from here,” in response to how the founding members know each
other. 75 My observation is that CCE members were able to remain connected over the
years because of the size of their community.
Based on these observations I find La Palma to be a less-unified CCE. The basis
of its relationships seems to be proximity in the community.

I ranked Ciudad Cortes at three, right in the middle of the five CCEs in terms of
unity.76 This group can be considered as generally unified. I made several observations
during my research that led me to this conclusion.
The members that head the group are all retired educators who have worked in the
school system together for years. They have high levels of trust with each other for this
reason. The president, secretary and one board overseer confirmed that they knew each
other in this way before joining the CCE. The board overseer even said that, “the group
came to me [when the CCE was forming] because I am also a leader in the
community.”77 The secretary said, “We worked together at the school for years, so we
know how each other work and there is trust between us.”78 Two additional members
were community educators, and the treasurer was educated by them in primary and
secondary school.
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Other members include people who stay rather involved either purposefully or
through their employment. One woman works at the local bakery, and sees other CCE
members (in some cases) daily when they come to pick up their morning bread.79 I saw
another two that sell pots and pans and clothes in the community, moving from door-todoor and pausing frequently to chat with community members.
On the other hand, some other members who remain from the failed
administration were left with hard feelings, though this number is few. They are still part
of the CCE (and participate by coming to meetings and taking loans), but they have not
necessarily gained trust for the current administration. One such member declined to
participate in an interview with me, and was very clear that she did not feel unified with
the new group. The secretary later told me that this person comes to meetings on a
regular basis to stir up issues among the new members, including questioning their
implementation of the credit regulations. She said that the group handles such matters by
including the person in the related discourse and questioning their own policies in order
to make sure all CCE members feel that their needs are met.80 Perhaps this is a sign of
presence of unity.
Based on these observations I find Ciudad Cortes in the middle range of unity
among the five CCEs. The basis of its relationships for the most part seems to be repeated
past contact and friendly involvement.

Next is Bahia Ballena, ranked four for second-highest unity. I chose this ranking
based on the strong bonds of friendship, family relation and past involvement between
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Interview with Tamara Contreras Somarriba on August 1, 2009. Transcribed.
Interview with Ligia Cruz Gomez from July 31, 2009.
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CCE members. Members of this CCE know each other through various other community
groups. The president formerly led the town sports committee. He was also involved in
other community groups such as the development association. He owns a tour company
in the center of town, and employs many town members and friends. His very large
family is spread all over town. Of the members that I interviewed, around one-third were
related to the president by blood or marriage.
The other original founders were either a part of one of these organizations,
players from the town soccer team, or family and close friends of either. Tito (Alvaro
Azofeifa Machado) said, “Walter, Junior, Milton and I have always been friends, we
grew up together, played soccer together. Plus, we were all good friends with Travis, and
worked on the local youth surfing program [a one-time stint] so in that way we have
stayed united.”81 Milton confirmed, “We’ve been friends for years. We all grew up
together. Walter told me that FINCA [CR] was having a meeting and that they wanted to
start a bank, so I went to the meeting with them to see what it was about.”82
The community is small (around two km squared) but slightly spread out, so some
of the original founding members who live near the center can be said to have been close
(best friends even), while others were just connected through a past history of
cooperation together. One founding member from the outskirts of town described this by
saying, “I have always been involved in everything, which is why I also decided to be in
the CCE. I know Walter and his family over the years.”83
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Based on these observations I find Bahia Ballena to be the second-most unified
among the five CCEs. The basis of its relationships for the most part seems to be repeated
and deliberate past friendships and community involvement.

Last, I ranked Sierpe five as the most unified CCE. I chose this ranking based on
the fact that over half of the founding group members are related. The original board
members are close friends and family. The president and treasurer are married. The
treasurer stated, “Most of us are family. We know each other and we decided to start the
CCE.”84 Their siblings constitute more than one-fifth of the founding members. In fact,
this family and its close friends are so unified that they spend almost all day together.
When I went for my interviews, I found them all in the same housing area. I took them
outside to the porch one-by-one to complete the interviews.
Other non-related community members have strong bonds of friendship with the
others, or had previously worked together. Many of them had participated in past town
projects, including the development association and the tourism association. The
secretary is employed by the president (in the center of town) and has a long-standing
close friendship with the family. He said, “I work for Giuseppe in his repair shop. I know
the Morales family because I have worked here for years and the family lives right next
door.”85 Another founding member owns a pottery-painting business, and I observed that
the Morales children paint there. They also walk to school with her daughter every day.
In addition, while Sierpe can be considered spread out, the community has had
past problems that have led to the further unification of two distinct groups in the area.
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Interview with Raquel Acuña Morales on July 24, 2009. Transcribed.
Interview with Yerin Nuñez Mendiola on July 24, 2009. Transcribed.
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The group that is involved in the CCE (with whom about half of the community sides)
has a strong desire to be unified, stay unified, and show the community that one group
can work together in a trustworthy manner that eschews corruption. Raquel described this
when she said, “Many other community development projects have been corrupt in this
town. Some of us know each other from these projects. Others want to be a part of a
community development project done right. We are going to stay together and do the job
right because we want to prove to the community that community development projects
can work.”86
Based on these observations I find Sierpe to be the most unified among the five
CCEs. The basis of its relationships for the most part seems to be family relation and
strong, long-term friendship

CCE Rankings:
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Figure 4.1
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Interview with Raquel Morales on July 24, 2009. Transcribed.
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La Palma

Puerto
Jimenez

Survey Responses- Data on Attitudes toward the Group:
The following chart represents the survey answers from each CCE. The survey
asked respondents why they decided to join the group, and whether or not they feel that
they have responsibilities as a group member. The results show that all five groups’
members feel a high degree of group obligation. These responses are not reflected in the
community rankings, but nevertheless serve to show that an overall “group sentiment” is
indeed present in every community.

CCE members'
attitudes toward the group
Total Number

25
20
15

Positive Responses to
Knowledge of Group
Obligations
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5

Interviewed

0
Bahia Sierpe
Ballena
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Figure 4.2
Analysis:
The first Hypothesis states that the more unified the microfinance group, the
lower the level of defaults. The following chart compares unity rankings with CCE
default rates:
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Percentage of long-term defaults
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Figure 4.387
Based on the foregoing evidence, higher levels of unity are not associated with
long-term default rates. Bahia Ballena, which ranked higher in unity, was the only
community that showed long-term defaults in both August and December of 2009.88 I
therefore conclude that this Hypothesis is not supported by the evidence gathered from
these five communities during August and December of 2009.

Limitations:
The foregoing finding shows that a CCE formed from a relatively unified
community may still have problems with defaults. This suggests that other factors are
also involved in explaining default rates, and justifies exploration of Hypotheses 2 and 3.
Before doing so, however, it is worth noting another possibility- that my finding may be a
function of certain regrettable but necessary limitations in this study. This chapter, in

87
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common with the others, has important limitations, discussed in the conclusion to this
thesis. Beyond these, this chapter has more specific limitations as well.
First, the data on which I based my conclusions about group unity may be
unreliable. Although the interviewees were selected randomly, it is possible that those
interviewed can be considered “more involved” or “better-known” CCE members in most
cases. Later interviews with both the FINCA CR Field Worker and two Peace Corps
Volunteers working on behalf of FINCA CR in the communities showed that of my
random list, most participants that I ended up interviewing owned more than one share,
and occasionally if not always came to group meetings. One reason for this could have
been the participants’ proximity to the center of the community. During my research trip,
I was limited to walking and public transportation, and was rarely in possession of a bike
for traveling. In addition, there may be a stronger reason for why “less-involved”
members were not available for interviews- they are too busy to be more involved. Being
busy could negatively affect their strong ties with the community. To develop a more
accurate picture of relative community unity, I would need to interview almost every
CCE member-- or administer a survey to a representative sample.
Second, my survey questions asking subjects about the degree of solidarity they
felt with the group may be unreliable. As discussed in further detail in the conclusion to
this thesis, these questions are inherently subjective both from the standpoint of the
interviewees and from my own standpoint as a researcher analyzing the subjects’
answers. In addition, it is possible that some interviewees would be reluctant to admit a
lack of solidarity with their CCE—and, at least implicitly, to admit to selfish motivations
for joining the group. On the other hand, some of my interviewees did make such
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admissions. From my observation it did not appear to be taboo to state this- perhaps
because the groups are legal business entities which are formed for the purpose of giving
loans and making money. Nevertheless, their responses are highly subjective, and
therefore I have used them only as a supplement to the unity rankings (which have their
own limitations, as discussed in the conclusion to this thesis).

Conclusion:
I conclude that the data on levels of unity gathered during August and December
2009 does not show a correlation between strong unity and lower default rates. The study
would have more reliability if the data gathered were less subjective, i.e. if there were
more objective proof that the relationships between town members was/was not strong.
More information is needed to prove whether unity is or is not related to low default rates
in FINCA CR CCEs. The information would need to represent a proper sample size of all
CCEs in Costa Rica, and members who are less-involved in the CCE would need to be
interviewed as well, to develop that more accurate picture of relative community unity.
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Chapter 5- The Effects of Good-Quality Training

Introduction
This chapter tests Hypothesis 2: the better trained the members of the microfinance
group, the lower the level of defaults. I start by describing the training program in detail,
and then operationalizing my variables. Interviews with CCEs that received inadequate
trainings will show consequences that may occur. Next I test each of the five CCEs in
order to determine if the evidence supports this hypothesis. Last, I describe the
limitations of this Hypothesis.

The “22 steps”89 of FINCA CR’s training:
In the context of FINCA CR, good-quality (or ideal) training includes the
completion of 22 steps, and a one-year follow up training where a facilitator attends the
CCE meetings on a regular basis to provide extra mentoring on needed subjects.90 The 22
steps are the basis of training for the CCEs. They are 22 workshops that constitute the
process of becoming a CCE. Their purpose is to train community members in skills
needed to run a CCE. The steps are completed once a week in three-hour sessions. The
workshop themes and descriptions are as follows:

1. Introductory notes- general information about the upcoming training workshops,
explanation of trainer and participant responsibilities, introduction to the 22 steps
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From FINCA CR document: FINCA CR manual for Peace Corps Volunteers.
Interview with Luis Jimenez on August 12, 2009. Transcribed.
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2. Informative presentation- participants learn about CCEs and doubts are discussed,
recognition of the value of CCEs and participants’ official agreement to start process
3. Organizational regulations- overview of general CCE regulations, participants’
personalization of their CCE’s guidelines, functions of the board
4. The regulation of shareholder equity- basic functions of shareholder capital, CCE
members create equity regulations
5. Program regulations for “Education Investment Program” for youth- introduction to
education investment program, creating program regulations
6. Credit regulations- rules on granting credit to shareholders
7. Introduction to constituent meetings- official creation of the CCE, first official meeting
as a CCE, members join by buying shares
8. Administration of credit- giving the first loan, shareholders familiarize with the process
from solicitation to administering the credit
9. Basic administration- what is needed to be a good administrator, S.W.O.T. analysis
(strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats)
10. Annual operating plan- creation of the plan
11. Administrative documents- fundamental elements of board meetings, basic agendas,
meeting minutes, book of shareholders and agreement journals
12. Auxiliary accounting- importance of accounting systems for CCEs, basic knowledge
of the accounting system
13. Control of capital- importance of shares, keeping records of monthly capital
14. Control of “Education Investment Program”- familiarization with the youth savings
program, registration of technical records
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15. Financial reports- basics, utility and process of accounting systems, income
statements, balance sheets
16. Effective CCE meetings- managing reunions and their obstacles
17. Working as a team- concepts and roles
18. Board reports- responsibilities and quality of board action, practice CCE meeting
(general assembly)
19. The stoplight- evaluating the program, diagnosis
20. Preparation for inauguration- details
21. Inauguration- present the CCE to the community, formally pass out shares

Once all trainings are completed and the group is officially inaugurated as a CCE,
they begin accepting loan solicitations and granting credit on a regular basis. Under the
latest methodology, the one-year follow-up trainings occur when funding is allotted for
them in the project grant. FINCA CR just developed and sharpened the methodology
within the last two years, so any CCE older than this may have received what is now
considered average to inadequate training. 91

Follow-up trainings:

FINCA CR follow-up trainings are intended to last for one year after CCE
inauguration. Their purpose is to assist CCE administrators (the board) in any area in
which they may need extra support. Trainings occur every one-to-two weeks at the time
most convenient for both the facilitator and all other members, which is generally at the
91

Interview with Luis Jimenez on August 12, 2009. Transcribed.
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CCE board meetings. One day a month the CCE holds an assembly meeting where all
members are encouraged to attend. On this day the trainings are right before the meeting,
and largely consist of filling in gaps in the financial statements on which the board will
report.
Follow-up trainings are more like mentor sessions than classroom sessions. There
is no planned agenda unless the board decides to create one with the facilitator. The
facilitator stays at the board meeting, watching how it is conducted, and answers any
needed questions. If an area of doubt arises, the facilitator will know whether the board
and other CCE members need a quick reminder or another entire session on the subject.
Typically the area of most need is financial administration, since accounting concepts are
new to most participants. CCE Sacrín believes that the follow-up sessions are highly
necessary in order for a CCE to reach a level where it can operate on its own. They stated
that FINCA CR does not have enough availability to assist all CCEs in areas of need, so
without the follow-up trainings by the facilitator, most CCEs do not know how to manage
operations correctly.92

Consequences of Inadequate Training:

The previous training received by Ciudad Cortes serves as a further example of
the value of quality training for CCEs.93 The CCE’s original group did not receive all 22
steps. According to Touche, the former treasurer, less training was given and it was
sporadic and lacked follow-up. The trainer did not adequately explain accounting
92
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concepts to the group. German Soto confirmed this fact.94 As a result, the group did not
maintain proper accounting practices. Since they had a lack of knowledge about
collecting interest on loans and giving dividend pay outs at the end of the year, neither of
these was done.95
Board members of CCE Sacrín claimed they also went through a period of
insecurity in financial administration. They also claim to have received inadequate
training when they first formed in the mid-1990s. Because of confusion about accounting
concepts and how to manage CCE growth in the community, there were times when the
CCE was not properly managing the money. They believe that it was a result of a lack of
training. They also said that after two years of lost contact with FINCA CR, the CCE
almost fell apart, so they got in touch with FINCA CR again and were able to convince
them to fund another training program. The three board members who explained this
history think that the extra training and motivation from FINCA CR is what turned the
CCE around.96
These two examples illustrate the importance of good training and the
consequences of inadequate training. I now compare the trainings that occurred in the
five communities in the Osa. By determining the quality of training that was received, I
am able to compare the evidence and determine whether training is associated with
high/low default rates.

Operationalizing Hypothesis 2: THE BETTER TRAINED THE MEMBERS OF THE
MF GROUP, THE LOWER THE LEVEL OF DEFAULTS.
94
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By good-quality training I mean a complete training in business skills which will
create more knowledgeable CCE members (the 22 steps), and in addition, one year of
follow-up training to ensure that members fully grasp the proposed concepts. In this study
I set out to measure the quality of training that each of the five CCEs received. In order to
do this I collected data from CCE board members about the trainings that occurred. I
interviewed a sample of CCE members from each community, and these interviews are
the source of my data. Questions included: Did you complete FINCA CR’s 22 steps?
What type of support did you receive after that? (And if they received follow-up
training), What were the trainings like? 97 Information on the training received was
confirmed by cross-checking with other respondents, FINCA CR headquarters and the
Director of the Osa region. I triangulated the information in order to judge and label the
quality of training that occurred in each community.
In order to label the training, I chose to create a breakdown of quality levels
depending on the amount of time that CCEs spent with their facilitator and give them
numerical values from one to three. The more time that CCEs spent with the facilitator,
the higher the possibility is that they gained a firm grasp on the concepts. Since FINCA
CR deliberately aims for one year of follow-up training, this is considered high quality. A
significant amount of follow-up training below one year is considered average, and
anything less inadequate. This is because both FINCA CR and the most successful longstanding CCE in Costa Rica believe that a significant amount of follow-up training is a
bare necessity for a CCE’s success.98 Therefore, completion of the 22 steps and 10-12
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See Appendix 1.
Interview with Luis Cordero, President of CCE Sacrín, on August 10, 2009. Transcribed.
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months of follow-up training is considered good-quality training (Value: three).
Completion of the 22 steps with six to nine months of follow-up training is considered
average (Value: two). Completion of the 22 steps (or less) with six months or less of
follow-up training is considered inadequate (Value: one).

CCE training:

Bahia Ballena was labeled as having received inadequate training (value of one)
based on the lack of follow-up training received. This community did finish the 22 steps
but received no official follow-up. A Peace Corps small-business volunteer was living in
the community at the time, but was not able to act as a good resource since he wasn’t
officially trained by FINCA CR. Later he was hired as the Director of the Osa (for
FINCA CR) and told me, “FINCA CR did not train Bahia Ballena like they were
supposed to. The group was formed under an older form of the new methodology, but
technically they still should have gotten follow up training.”99
The president explained this further by saying he, “did finish the 22 steps but they
[FINCA CR] left us out after that. Sometimes we needed help and called FINCA but they
were not available. Accounting was a new concept to us and it is difficult for Ronald [the
treasurer] too. Maybe we weren’t totally prepared to go alone.”100 Indeed, when I initially
found the treasurer in town I requested the most updated accounting balance and credit
profile. They had not been completed in over six months. Ronald spent all day (8am9pm) at the CCE office working on them. When I left to head to the next town they were
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still not completed. He told me that there were things that he didn’t understand which he
would need help with in order to have them completed. The Osa Director did help him
and I just barely received the document before I left the country- over a month later.
Ronald explained his training, saying, “I went to the 22 meetings but they
[FINCA CR] left me by myself after. My reports are always late because it is so time
consuming and I don’t understand some things. Sometimes I called FINCA CR for help
but they don’t have time to help me, or they are not in the office. I have to take other jobs
to support my family so I can’t always call during the day.”101 From my observations it
seemed that other board members were feeling animosity towards Ronald because of
their current financial situation, since he gets paid to be the treasurer. I inquired about the
salary and was informed that it was less than $40 a month- a very small sum in Costa
Rican terms. The board wanted to hire an outside administrator to complete the reports,
but they could not afford one because so many payments were late. Training that was not
received could potentially have been extremely beneficial to this community. At the least,
if after further training Ronald could not grasp the concepts, the facilitator would have
known that an administrative change with additional financial training was needed.
Based on these observations I find Bahia Ballena to have received inadequate
trainings. The CCE received no follow-up training in conjunction with the 22-step
methodology.

Sierpe was labeled as having received average-quality training (value of two)
based on the fact that it received only about 7 months of follow-up training, which were
completed by two separate facilitators. The Director of the Osa (Travis Bays) completed
101
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the 22 steps and five months follow up, and Matt Meade completed the next two months
of follow up. Then the one-year point had passed but FINCA CR was not employing
anyone in the region.
Fortunately, as several members on the board have prior accounting experience,
bookkeeping is not as much of an issue for this group. I spent a while at the
president/treasurers house during my stay. Though they only received average training, I
saw the treasurer complete the monthly reports with much ease, though she did state that
she had one question that she would need to take up with FINCA CR the next time she
saw a representative. She stated, “I knew some of the information because we run [a]
business, but some of the accounting trainings were new for me. Travis was coming since
January but then he got married and hasn’t come back.”102 I asked Travis about this and
he told me that the project money had run out, and that he was waiting for another grant
to come in before going back.103 A board overseer also confirmed, “I knew most of the
information already since I have been on the development association. Some of the
information was new- like the accounting for CCEs. Travis was helping, but I know he
hasn’t been back in a while.”104 It seems that though the CCE did not received ideal
training, the members’ past experience with bookkeeping has benefitted them.
Based on the above observations I find Sierpe to have received average training.
The CCE only received follow-up training just above an inadequate level.

Ciudad Cortes was labeled as having received average training (value of two)
based on the fact that it received only about 8 months of follow-up training, which were
102
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completed by two separate facilitators. Cortes underwent the same facilitator changes as
Sierpe, and since the new group was formed on month before Sierpe, they received one
more month of training.
The CCE’s treasurer described the status of the group’s accounting knowledge
when he said, “I have a high school degree so I know I can learn the information. But I
still need help with accounting. Sometimes the numbers don’t match up and since Travis
left us I have to call FINCA [CR] but they can’t always help me. Also it is not easy to
explain things over the phone. It is better when someone is here to explain it to me.
Travis hasn’t come back since May but hopefully he can come soon to help me.”105 The
secretary also confirmed by saying, “We need help with the interest and with the
dividends so Travis can help us with that when he comes.”106 Both asked me to speak
with Travis and mention this request to him.
During my short stay in Cortes, this accounting request was not answered. The
group was able to give me an updated report, but with one exception. One loan that
carried over from the past administration was not listed because until the CCE spoke with
FINCA CR, they did not know the proper procedure to follow for interest collection.107
Based on these observations I find Ciudad Cortes to have received average
training. The group was still not confident with accounting practices after 8 months of
follow-up training.

La Palma was labeled as having received good-quality training (value of three)
based on the fact that it received FINCA CR’s 22 step methodology, and one year of
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follow-up training. Matt Meade was a Peace Corps Volunteer who was formally trained
by FINCA CR and started this CCE. He was in the community for over a year after the
inauguration and the CCE was his primary Peace Corps project. His presence is deemed
by CCE members to be one reason for their understanding of policies.
The president of the group said, “We did the 22 steps and Matt always comes to
the meetings. Matt has been with us through the whole process. He has been helping us
since we started and we have changed the treasurer so he always works with the treasurer.
He comes to the meetings and helps us when we need it.”108 The secretary expressed the
same in saying, “We did the 22 steps and Matt was with us. Matt always comes to the
meetings to make sure everything is going like it is supposed to, so if we have a question
we just ask him there.”109
I saw evidence of this during my stay in La Palma. I attended a group meeting.
The setup was informal, but members behaved professionally with their peers. During
this meeting, the group was to report to attendees on the current state of the credit profile,
and grant funds to the newest loan applicant. The group which had been in follow-up
training for over nine months at this point had a question for Matt about the sum of
monies to be awarded pursuant to the amount of shares and co-signers that the applicant
had. Matt gave an on-the-spot mini-training to all attendees on the issue. They expressed
understanding at the end of the training.
Based on these observations I find La Palma to have received good-quality
training. The CCE completed FINCA CR’s ideal methodology.
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Interview with Alban Sequerra on July 22, 2009. Transcribed.
Interview with Angela Batista on July 19. 2009. Transcribed.
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Puerto Jimenez was labeled as having received good-quality training (value of
three) based on the fact that it received FINCA CR’s 22 step methodology, and one year
of follow-up training. Matt Meade also formally trained this CCE and spent one full year
after its inauguration working on follow-up training with them. He did ten months of this
year with the Peace Corps and the other two as the Regional Osa Facilitator. I was in
town during month ten of the follow-up training.
The president, secretary, treasurer and board overseers all mentioned that Matt
was a help to the group. The treasurer said, “Matt always helps me and comes to the
meetings. Sometimes he helps me outside of the meetings.”110 Board Overseer Estarlin
also said, “Matt always comes to the meetings and makes sure that things are operating
right.”111 My observation is that Meade’s main role was more that of an overseer during
this time. At a town assembly meeting, he sat on the edge of the room. He did not instruct
the group until they expressed doubt and looked to him for help. My observation is that
they seemed to be on the brink of self-sufficiency.
Based on these observations I find Puerto Jimenez to have received good-quality
training. The CCE completed FINCA CR’S ideal methodology.
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Interview with Maureen Mosquera on July 24, 2009. Transcribed.
Interview from July 18. 2009. Transcribed.
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Quality of training received (one to three) in communities:

Level of Training Received

Value: Quality of Training
3
2
1
0
Bahia Ballena

Sierpe

Ciudad
Cortes

La Palma

Puerto
Jimenez

CCE Community

Figure 5.1

Analysis:
Hypothesis 2 stated that the better trained the members of the microfinance group,
the lower the level of defaults. The following chart compares training values with CCE
default rates:
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Default rate over 60 days
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Figure 5.2 112

Based on the foregoing evidence, good-quality training is associated with low
default rates. More specifically, it appears that follow-up training (even an average
amount) is associated with low default rates. Bahia Ballena was the only CCE of the
group to receive inadequate training and was the only CCE to show default rates over 60
days (not once, but twice) in its credit profile. I therefore conclude that this Hypothesis is
supported by the evidence gathered from these five communities during August and
December of 2009.

Limitations:
The foregoing finding shows that a CCE formed from a well-trained community
may limit the chance of defaults. Still, other factors may also be involved in explaining
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Sierpe, Ciudad Cortes, La Palma and Puerto Jimenez did not report loans defaulting over 60 days in August or
December of 2009.
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default rates, which justifies exploration of hypothesis 3. Before doing so, however, it is
worth noting another possibility- that my findings may be unreliable, a function of the
regrettable but necessary limitations in this study. Again, this chapter, in common with
the others, has important limitations, as discussed in the conclusion to this thesis. Beyond
these, this chapter has more specific limitations as well.
First, CCE members managing financial administration may have different levels
of education. This could affect CCE accounting. More educated individuals could be
more likely to grasp accounting concepts. In truth, it seems that those CCEs whose
members had prior accounting experience were in less need of serious help from a
facilitator. This could affect the reliability of my study because, if it were true, financial
health could be less related to training than prior knowledge.
Second, there was no way for me to measure the amount of attention that CCE
members gave the trainings. Board members are selected by the seventh of the 22 steps.
There is the possibility that after this was done, only the treasurer put his full attention
toward accounting-related topics. If other peers did not grasp the concepts, they were
probably less likely to be able to support their treasurer when an issue arose. This lack of
attention could affect the reliability of my conclusions. The trainings could have been
sufficient based on members’ previous education. There is the chance that members may
not have fully supported each other to the best of their ability.

Conclusion:
I conclude that more training, specifically a significant amount of follow-up
training (over 6 months), is associated with lower default rates. For a more reliable
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conclusion, I would need a sample of CCE default rates after each CCE is furtherremoved from training and has been on its own for at least one year. In this way I would
be able to make a more reliable comparison of the five CCEs.
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Chapter 6- The Effects of Discipline

Introduction
This chapter tests Hypothesis 3: the greater the financial discipline imposed on
group members by administrators, the lower the level of defaults. I start with the
operationalization of my variables, and then test each of the five communities in order to
determine if the evidence supports this Hypothesis. Last, I describe the limitations of this
Hypothesis.

Operationalizing Hypothesis 3:

By financial discipline I mean paying on time in accordance with the rules, and
paying late fees on defaulted payments as a method of correction and training. Discipline
must be imposed to ensure that operations are run properly and to set precedent for future
borrowers. CCE administrators are primarily responsible for discipline as their task is to
manage the group’s money. All CCE members have interest in discipline because if
money is not repaid, there is the risk that it could become a long-term issue where the
money becomes difficult to retrieve, in which case there would be no money to pay
shareholders’ dividends.
In this study I set out to measure the degree of discipline for each of the five
CCEs. In order to do this, I collected data on whether or not members understand credit
rules; and whether or not they follow them. This information concerns the extent to
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which the CCE administrators collect loan payments on time, and punish borrowers who
do not pay on time.
I interviewed a portion of CCE members from each community in order to
determine the degree of discipline imposed, and these interviews are the source of my
data. Interviewees were selected randomly, but based on availability to participate in
interviews. The information was confirmed by cross-checking with other respondents. I
used this triangulated information to judge the discipline of, and label, each group.
Questions were: Does the board follow the CCE credit regulations? Have late payments
ever occurred within the group? What action does the group take when there are cases of
late payments?113

Degrees of Discipline:

In order to measure the degrees of discipline, I briefly explain the responses from
the questions (Does the board follow the credit regulations? Have late payments ever
occurred within the CCE?). Next I will rank each CCE from one to five in terms of
discipline, one being least disciplined and five being most disciplined. The ranking is
chosen based on the data on group behavior towards credit regulations.
In order to rank the CCEs, I chose to create a breakdown of types of discipline,
based on different reasons for how CCE members deal with payments in accordance with
the set credit regulations. Higher discipline is characterized by knowledge of obligations
during cases of default, and a serious commitment to take fast action and require penalty
fees. Therefore, obvious and deliberate expression of these characteristics bares heavier
113

See appendix 1.
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weight on the notion of discipline. Next follows knowledge of obligations with a lack of
assertion (meaning a positive statement or declaration), and then disregard for credit
regulations. These measures are subjective because they are based not only on members’
statements regarding discipline, but also the ways in which they expressed them. By
creating rankings, I am able to compare the levels of discipline to the default rates in
order to see if the level of discipline may be associated with high default rates.

Community Discipline- Data on Group Behavior towards Credit Regulations:

Bahia Ballena was ranked one for the lowest level of discipline. I made several
observations during my research which led me to this conclusion. Two board members
were defaulting on payments and four of their immediate family members were also
defaulting on payments.114 In addition, board members admitted to not collecting money
or completing financial reports for the group.
Three of the four board members admitted to not following the credit regulations.
One had moved away from the community and never been replaced. The president stated,
“We have cases of late payments. We don’t follow the credit regulations. Ronald is
supposed to collect the loan payments but it doesn’t work because people don’t take him
seriously. He is not very sure of himself so he accepts people’s excuses… I just don’t
have time for the board.” 115 Ronald (the treasurer) explained in more detail, “No, we
don’t follow the credit regulations. The board left me with the financial responsibilities. I
get paid but it is only [about] $40 USD a month. That is not enough money to support my
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According to CCE documents.
Interview with Walter Brenes on July 14, 2009.
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family, so I have to take other jobs too. That prevents me from being able to go around
collecting the money. When I get there [to collect money], people say they don’t have
the money at that moment, this is why we have such a big problem.” 116 The Osa Director
told me that the group rarely meets, and that most members are not even aware of how
many loans are overdue.117 Evidence from all of my other community interviews proved
that almost every CCE member was out of the loop on current issues. There had not been
a board meeting or a general assembly in over six months.
Not only do most members not know about the current default rate, but many
believe that it is acceptable to pay later if they did not have money at that point in time.
“The current economic situation” was a common excuse among members for why they
may not pay on time, but I was later able to confirm that most of them were still
employed, and that their co-signers were also employed. One member stated, “Sometimes
we can’t pay on time, so we just pay later when we have the money. It’s okay if we pay
later. Also sometimes we don’t have money to pay the penalty, so we give what we can.”
118

Another local member suggested that the worldwide economic situation was not

affecting people’s ability to pay, but that she believed that too many community members
have this crisis “in their mind.” 119 She is a local business owner and reported that she did
not feel losses during this time period.
Based on these observations I find Bahia Ballena to be the least-disciplined CCE.
The CCE does not follow credit regulations or even meet as they are required. Group
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members are not aware of the financial situation, nor have they wondered why the group
has ceased to hold town assembly meetings.

Ciudad Cortes was ranked two for the second-lowest level of discipline. I made
several observations during my research which led me to this conclusion. My observation
is that there is a strong knowledge among board members of their responsibilities, and
that this CCE seems to take their operations seriously. At the same time, there was one
case of a lack of assertion- related to confusion on what amount needed to be paid on a
loan. I believe that this group knows the rules and obligations, but that more assertive
action needs to be taken in financial management.
Board members feel that they follow the credit regulations. The president,
secretary and treasurer all expressed knowledge of board obligations and recognized that
they follow the credit regulations. All mentioned what they would do in the case of a late
payment, and the president said that it had happened in the past, and that they did follow
the proper procedure for collecting the money.120 At the same time, both he and the
treasurer expressed an incidence of uncertainty regarding the payment process. The
president stated, “We have had late payments, but when that happens it is our first
responsibility. Right now we have a late payment, a result of confusion because we
switched the board and there was confusion about how much she [the debtor] had to pay.
She doesn’t pay the late fee because this is a special case.” 121 This board had been in
operation (and this loan had already existed) for over six months at the time of this
statement. Second, the treasurer said, “If there is a late payment my first job is to go
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Interview with German Soto Elizondo on August 4, 2009. Transcribed.
Interview with German Soto Elizondo on August 4, 2009. Transcribed.
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cover it. There is a fee of [about] $1USD per day if they don’t pay on time. We have to
collect this too because it takes time to go collect money from someone’s house.” When I
inquired about the confusion regarding the one loan, he said that he would need to talk to
a FINCA CR member to figure out how to cover it, and that for now they would not
charge late payments or collect money from this person.122 He had not called FINCA CR
requesting help- he seemed to be waiting for FINCA CR to become available to him.
Based on these observations I find Ciudad Cortes to be the second-least
disciplined CCE. While the group does have a clear knowledge of the credit regulations
and charging of penalty fees, I observed a lack of assertion when there was a case of
confusion.

I made the decision to skip the third rank. This is because I felt that two
communities overwhelmingly expressed good discipline, and that they were tied for the
fifth rank. Also, the community which would have ranked third was also highly
disciplined. For this reason, I moved it to rank four.

La Palma was ranked four for discipline. I made several observations during my
research which led me to this conclusion. This CCE had a strong knowledge of boardmember responsibility and knowledge of procedure for processing late payments. The
group mentioned knowledge of incentives to stay financially disciplined. In addition, the
Peace Corps volunteer (Matt Meade) that trained this CCE attended every meeting that
occurred the subsequent year. I believe that his constant reinforcement of the credit ruling
is likely to have had a strong effect. One group member even expressed that they gained
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Interview with Geovanny Murillo Herrera on August 4, 2009. Transcribed.
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the value of discipline from time spent with Matt. While this group expressed financial
discipline on-par with the most highly-ranked CCEs, I kept it a rank lower because the
group seemed to obviously express that Meade was a reason for why they were
disciplined; they did not explicitly take ownership of the value of discipline.
The president stated, “Yes, we follow the credit regulations. Matt is very strict
with us about that. We have to be transparent so that we can get more shareholders, more
capital, keep giving more loans, and grow.”123 One board overseer confirmed this by
saying, “Yes, we follow the credit regulations. Matt is with us and he taught us about
being transparent. If someone doesn’t pay then the whole group knows, because we meet
every month to talk about the finances.”124 Both of these important CCE members knew
the regulations, yet mentioned Matt as a factor in the group’s discipline, rather than
expressing it as their duty.
Later in December I contacted the group’s secretary, Angela Batista. I asked for
an explanation of the current default in the credit profile during the month of December.
She told me, “We have a late payment now, and we are looking for the person to collect
the money. They shouldn’t pay late. They will have a penalty on the payment.”125
For these reasons I find La Palma to be a CCE with good discipline, ranked in
position four. The group did clearly express discipline, and even gave an example of
charging penalty on a late payment.

Puerto Jimenez and Sierpe are tied at rank five for having the most discipline of
the CCEs. I felt that they both expressed high levels of discipline and were assertive in
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doing so. I made several observations during my research which led me to this
conclusion, and will begin by describing Puerto Jimenez.
Board members in Puerto Jimenez described credit regulations in detail and were
much more professional than all of the other groups in financial reporting. Their meetings
were formal and documents were completely prepared beforehand (something that was
lacking- even if only to a small degree- in other communities). I observed that this
professionalism aided their ability to be exceptionally assertive.
The president, secretary, treasurer, and both board overseers knew the credit
regulations. The president said, “If someone pays late then we have to get the money as
soon as possible. No one can pay late.”126 The treasurer said, “If they pay late then they
have to pay a fee. We have to be transparent, so everyone will know if someone pays
late.”127 They also expressed FINCA CR’s number one reason for why groups should be
financially disciplined—“the money belongs to all of us.”128 This is a main theme that
was reiterated to me by several FINCA CR employees. FINCA CR believes that with this
sentiment, CCE members feel more incentive to make sure that the money is where it
should be. During my stay in Puerto Jimenez, I was able to attend a CCE assembly
meeting. Over 15 CCE members were in attendance, and the treasurer and president were
announcing the most recent financial reports. At this meeting it was announced that the
first CCE member ever was 8 days late on their loan payment. Over 13 members
discussed how to proceed with the situation. One CCE member challenged the group to
give the debtor a chance to come up with the money without paying a penalty. 129 The rest
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of the CCE members quickly reminded her that anyone who pays late must pay a penalty,
and that extra time cannot be given under any circumstances, because then all CCE
members would feel that they had this right.
For these reasons I’ve ranked Puerto Jimenez at five, tied with Sierpe as the mostdisciplined CCE. I observed that this group has a strong knowledge of, and dedication to,
credit regulations, and that they are assertive in expressing this among the group.

Last, I ranked Sierpe at five for being another of the most-disciplined CCEs. I
made several observations during my research which led me to this conclusion. These
observations are that the board members know the rules and regulations very well,
express assertion in managing group finances, and that they understand that capital
belongs to the group, and is every member’s responsibility.
The president struck me as a good implementer of rules. As stated in an earlier
chapter, he owns his own business where he already exerts financial discipline. In an
interview he told me that, “if it [a late payment] happens we are going to go to collect the
money. They can’t pay late because we want this CCE to serve the community. They
have to pay on time; we are going to be very strict about that so that people know. If they
don’t pay on time, they have to pay the penalty.”130 In a separate interview his wife the
treasurer agreed, stating, “We are serious and we let people in the community know that
we are serious… we are here to work and make the CCE work.”131 One board overseer
went further, letting me know that the CCE has let shareholders know that late payments
pay off part off a credit card with higher interest. While this is allowed in CCEs (members can take out loans for any
personal reason), it showed that this group member could have potentially been trying to buy time for her fellow
member in case she may have one day needed some time herself. In this case, the group may have deterred her impetus
to do so. Interview from July 18, 2009. Transcribed.
130
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are not acceptable, and reminded me that, “the money belongs to all of us, so we have to
protect it in this way.”132
I believe that because of the past history of Sierpe being split because of rumors
of corruption (mentioned in an earlier chapter); this group has a strong incentive to make
sure that the rules are followed. They expressed their seriousness several times
throughout my week in Sierpe. Over 15 members attended the financial meetings in this
town as well- making both Puerto Jimenez and Sierpe the most-attended CCE meetings
that I observed. I believe that this is a result of strong CCE management, because board
members are able to keep the group motivated and reminded of why they must continue
to attend meetings.
For the above reasons Sierpe is also ranked five as one of the most-disciplined
CCEs. I observed that this group is extremely dedicated to its operations, and making
sure that all things remain in order and transparent to not only all CCE members, but also
the entire community.
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CCE Degrees of Discipline:

Discipline rank

Value: CCE Discipline
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Figure 6.1
Analysis:

The third Hypothesis states that the greater the financial discipline imposed on
group members by administrators, the lower the level of defaults. The following chart
compares degrees of group discipline with CCE default rates:
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Percentage of long-term defaults
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Figure 6.2 133
Based on the foregoing, greater financial discipline imposed on group members
by the administration appears to be associated with prevention of long-term defaults. The
data gathered during August and December of 2009 showed that discipline is a deterrent
of long-term defaults. No disciplined CCEs had problems with recurring defaults.

Limitations:

The foregoing finding shows that discipline is associated with prevention of longterm defaults. This conclusion remains tentative, however, due to the limitations of this
study. Aside from the common limitations found in the thesis conclusion, this chapter has
more specific limitations as well. The main limitation is that I lack more long-term data,
which would show a clearer correlation between discipline and higher or lower default
rates.
133
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Second, the reliability of my findings is weakened because it depends on CCE
members having told me the truth about their financial procedures. I am lacking actual
proof that CCEs charge their members late payments. If I had access to all financial
records since the first default, this would be easier to tell. The only data that was
available to me were monthly reports which stated the current financial status of each
CCE and borrower- proving whether group members paid on time. I have no tangible
proof that late payments were charged.

Conclusion:

I therefore conclude that this hypothesis is supported by the evidence gathered
from these five communities during August and December of 2009. Further financial
evidence is needed to prove that CCEs have actually charged penalty fees, in order to
remove this subjective factor from the study. Also, more information is needed to
determine whether good financial discipline will be related to long-term default rates.
Without knowing the future of the December 2009 default rates, it is difficult to compare
the four CCEs that had low default rates with Bahia Ballena.
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Chapter 7- Conclusion

Introduction
In this study I set out to determine what explains why some MFIs have high
default rates, while others have low ones. I studied five CCEs (all MFIs), which were
good case studies for contributing to answering my research question because they all
received similar program implementation yet one program had a default rate of around
71%. Comparing the four CCEs that had low default rates with the one that had a high
one, I aimed to determine what exactly caused this to happen when so many variables
were controlled. I compared group structures, training programs received, and amount of
discipline employed in each CCE in order to see if any of these factors were associated
with Bahia Ballena being at a high risk for failure. I tested three literature-based
hypotheses to arrive at the following conclusions.

Analysis
In chapter 4, the data gathered during August and December 2009 did not show a
correlation between unity and lower default rates. The only CCE with long-term default
rates ranked among the highest in unity. Of the other four CCEs, the lowest-ranked
showed zero long-term defaults.
In chapter 5, the data showed that insufficient training was associated with longterm defaults. I found that more training, and specifically a significant amount of followup training (over 6 months), correlated with lower default rates. The only CCE that
received below-average training was the only CCE with high default rates.
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In chapter 6, I found that greater financial discipline imposed on group members
by the administration appeared to be associated with prevention of long-term defaults.
Specifically, all four CCEs that claimed to have exercised discipline were financially
healthy. The only CCE that had financial problems appeared not to be disciplined.
Given the findings, although they are somewhat inconclusive because of the
limitations in this chapter, I conclude that hypotheses 2 and 3 are most associated with
financially healthy CCEs. Therefore, CCEs which are better-trained and more disciplined
are likely to have low default rates. I found that unity did not correlate with low default
rates.

Limitations

One main limitation in this thesis is that my overall sample size is not
representative of the total number of CCEs in Costa Rica. My findings offer a snapshot of
one small region in two brief and possibly unrepresentative periods of time. This means
that my small snapshot of the Osa peninsula cannot definitively represent my hypotheses
or FINCA CR’s program as a whole. In addition, the fact that there is only one failure
community in the study makes it difficult to draw conclusions. It is possible that with a
larger sample of CCEs on the national scale, my results would have been different.
The rankings of assets per CCE member in chapter three noted that while CCEs
had relatively similar numbers of total members, Bahia Ballena showed a much larger
amount of total assets. The asset figures are one of the few pieces of hard data that I have,
and they correlate very closely with the default rates that I observed. If my data is
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correct—and clearly further investigation to confirm this relationship is needed--it
suggests that higher default rates correlate both with higher local assets per member and
with higher total assets per member. In the thesis, however, I did not investigate possible
hypotheses explaining this strong correlation but instead investigated hypotheses in
which correlations were weaker. This suggests that my hypotheses may have highlighted
matters of secondary rather than primary importance in explaining defaults. (Related to
this point, see below for discussion of possible hypotheses for future research.)
In this study, based on my observations with CCE Sacrín in San Cristobal Norte
(the exemplary CCE), few members and large assets does not necessarily correlate with
high default rates. Sacrín has roughly the same amount of members as Bahia Ballena, and
much more capital assets. Their treasurer (who works alone, just as the treasurer in Bahia
Ballena) manages a credit profile of over $160,000. Based on this observation I believe
that what happened in Bahia Ballena was more a result of insufficient training, which
caused uncertainty on the part of the administrators.
Another limitation concerns the subjectivity of both the data and my
interpretations of the data. Most of the data on which I based my rankings came from
interviews in which subjects described relationships and feelings, or their administrative
involvement. Little of my data is purely observational. None of the interview data is
backed up by hard evidence, such as actual records of CCE activity, including proof of
friendships or proof that late payments were charged penalties.
There is a great deal of subjectivity involved in the way that I ranked the groups
as unified, well-trained or disciplined. Other observers might well have interpreted the
subjective data in different ways. Given more resources and time, I ideally would have
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hired and trained two coders who would have independently analyzed the data and made
the rankings. If they had differed in their analysis and rankings, I would have used a
third coder to break the tie. Instead, I based rankings on my own subjective interpretation
of the data.

Policy Implications
First and foremost, because there were so many limitations in my research, it is
clear that more research is needed to test the reliability of my conclusions. In particular,
my negative findings concerning hypothesis 1 contradict a wealth of social scientific data
on the importance of prior solidarity to a group’s functioning. Further research that might
replicate or refute my findings is therefore needed.
Of particular importance would be researching the strong correlation I observed
(but did not investigate or confirm) between a CCE’s default rate and either its local
assets per member or its total assets per member. If correct, this correlation might be
explained by the hypothesis that the lower the ratio of administrators to assets, the higher
the chances of default. The logic behind this hypothesis is that larger amounts of assets
require more financial monitoring. This means that as groups grow, they would need to
hire more administrators, or have their existing administrator dedicate more time to
financial monitoring. Yet in FINCA CR, CCEs seldom can afford to increase the number
of administrators or the amount of time worked. If further testing found this hypothesis to
be correct, then having less administrators managing more assets might increase the risk
of defaults. Conversely, more administrative monitoring could lower the risk of defaults.
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More generally, I would recommend further research about the causes of defaults
in MFIs.
To the extent that we can rely on the conclusions in this thesis, several more
specific recommendations can be considered. First, MFIs could concentrate less on the
internal factor of unity, and more on the approaches to CCE (or group) management. The
approaches to management depend on external factors.
In the external realm, education of the MFI members is critical. This finding
means that MFIs need more extensive systems of education for their members, and in the
case of FINCA CR this would mean the 22 steps, as well as more than six months of
follow-up training. For other MFIs (since there are different training structures in every
organization), I suggest monitoring and evaluations for training programs. Evaluations
would show whether training needs further support or more longevity in order to achieve
the best results. The correlation between better-trained members and lower default rates
shows that better-trained members are better equipped to manage their team, and are
more knowledgeable of the consequences of not following credit regulations. This
implication may represent a problem given that education and training programs are so
expensive. Full training requires funding that is sometimes not available.
Second, MFI administrators must exercise discipline. Discipline means requiring
members to pay on time and charging a penalty fee for late payments. The correlation
between bad discipline and high default rates shows what can happen when MFIs lose
control of their finances. This finding means that MFIs must be selective in choosing
their administrators, ensuring that they are extremely dedicated to discipline and also
understanding of why that is important. Given that it can be difficult to know whether an
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administrator will take initiative once in position, MFIs should create minimum
requirements for administrative positions, including experience above just being known
as “trustworthy” in their community. Perhaps prior administrative or money-handling
requirements are appropriate. This implication also applies to MFIs worldwide, not just
FINCA CR.

Conclusion
More research is clearly needed to help reduce the number of defaults in MFIs.
Notwithstanding the limitations in this study, it would be particularly worthwhile for
researchers to conduct further studies about the effects of unity, training, and discipline
on default rates. It seems possible that if both the external and internal factors discussed
here are more seriously considered, MFIs might have a better chance of maintaining low
default rates and meeting their purposes to reduce poverty and increase savings.
This conclusion is important for MFIs worldwide and is not limited to FINCA
CR. At this point, over 92 million people have been reached by microfinance, but it is
unclear how many of their lives have actually improved.134 Microfinance will only serve
the needs of the poor when it is truly working. Therefore determining the most effective
program implementation, particularly regarding default rates, is of great importance.

134

Daley-Harris, Sam. 2005. The State of the Microcredit Summit Campaign Report 2005. Washington: Microcredit
Summit. (http://www.microcreditsummit.org/pubs/reports/socr/2005/SOCR05.pdf).
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Appendix 1
Questions for Interviewees:

1. What is your name?
2. How long have you been a member?
3. How do the founding members know each other?
4. In what capacity had they worked together in the past?
5. Why did you decide to buy shares and become a group member?
6. Do you feel that you have responsibilities as a group member?
7. (If it was not about being in a community group or was not clear, I responded with):
Have you always been involved in community groups? If not, could say something more
about why you became interested in the CCE?
8. Did you complete FINCA CR’s 22 steps?
9. What type of support did you receive after that?
10. (And if they received follow-up training), What were the trainings like?
11. Does the board follow the CCE credit regulations?
12. Have late payments ever occurred within the group?
13. What action does the group take when there are cases of late payments?
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